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Article: 
Recently it has been argued that there are genuine moral dilemmas and that any theory which does not account 
for this fact is an unrealistic one.1 This represents a challenge to an assumption that most moral theorists have 
held: an adequate ethical theory must not allow for genuine moral quandaries. John Stuart Mill, for example, in 
the last paragraph of the second chapter of Utilitarianism, seems to be committed to such an assumption. Many 
others have also assented to this view.2 The consensus among those who hold this view seems to be that if a 
theory allows for moral dilemmas then there is some sense in which it is incoherent or inconsistent. Yet, oddly 
enough, the sense in which such a view would be incoherent is rarely, if ever, spelled out. Put another way, 
there seem to be no arguments for the belief that genuine moral dilemmas must be ruled out. W. D. Ross does 
suggest that if the same action were both morally required and forbidden, then "this would be to put an end to 
all ethical judgment."3 But how this would put an end to all ethical judgment, Ross does not explain. Once one 
sees that few, if any, arguments have been advanced to support the commonly held assumption, one realizes that 
the recent challenges must be taken seriously. 
 
Thus the main questions to which this paper is addressed are these: Must an adequate ethical theory allow for 
genuine moral dilemmas? Or must an adequate theory rule out such cases in order to avoid incoherence? I shall 
approach these questions by first spelling out two different senses in which our ethical reasoning might be 
thought to be inconsistent if there are genuine moral dilemmas. Discussing these two senses of inconsistency 
will cast light on the original questions. The conclusion that I shall eventually argue for is that we have good 
grounds for supposing that an adequate moral theory must rule out genuine dilemmas. 
 
Part I 
The first way in which the existence of moral dilemmas might be thought to lead to ethical inconsistency is this. 
The conjunction of three theses, each of which seems plausible and each of which is accepted by some 
philosophers, is inconsistent. The first thesis of the inconsistent triad is that there are genuine moral dilemmas. 
That is, there are situations in which an agent ought to do each of two things both of which he cannot do. If the 
situation is genuinely dilemmatic, then one is presented with two conflicting ought-claims and no further moral 
consideration is relevant to resolving the conflict. By contrast, a situation is merely apparently dilemmatic if 
two ought-claims conflict, but there are overriding moral reasons for acting on one rather than the other. Let us 
call the view that there are genuine moral dilemmas thesis (T1). The second thesis, (T2), is the view that 'ought' 
implies 'can.' This thesis states that the following is a principle of deontic logic: OA ⊃ ◊ A. This principle is 
sometimes taken to be an axiom of deontic logic.4 The third thesis is that the following principle of deontic 
logic holds: (OA & OB) ⊃ O(A & B). This thesis, which I shall call (T3), is also an axiom of standard deontic 
logic.5 The following argument, (A), shows that the conjunction of these three theses is inconsistent.6 
 
(A)  (i) OA     premise 
(ii) OB     premise 
(iii) ~ ◊ (A & B)   premise 
(iv) O(A & B) ⊃ ◊ (A & B)   premise 
(v) (OA & OB) ⊃ O(A & B)   premise 
(vi) O(A & B)    (i), (ii), (v), propositional calculus 
(vii) ~ O(A & B)   (iii), (iv), propositional calculus 
 
Lines (i), (ii), and (iii) represent thesis (T1). Theses (T2) and (T3) are set out in lines (iv) and (v) respectively. 
Or more accurately, lines (iv) and (v) are particular instances of these theses. Since lines (vi) and (vii) are 
contradictory, we know that the conjunction of the three is inconsistent. So at least one of the theses must be 
relinquished. 
 
It is obvious that there are at least three solutions to this problem. Each of these solutions involves giving up 
one of the theses in question. Thus one may say that argument (A) forces us to give up the view that there are 
genuine moral dilemmas; that is, it shows that (T1) must be dropped. Or to put the point more cautiously, it 
shows that a condition of adequacy for any ethical theory is that it not allow for genuine moral dilemmas. One 
who defends this view will claim that lines (i) - (iii) cannot be jointly satisfied. The denial that there can be 
genuine moral dilemmas may be expressed as follows: 
 
(ND) (OA & OB) ⊃ ◊ (A & B) 
 
Let us call this view solution (1). Others will claim that (A) shows that `ought' does not imply 'can.' If one omits 
line (iv) and line (vii), which depends on (iv), one will have a counterexample to this principle. This position I 
shall call solution (2). Solution (3) is the view that the third thesis is the one that can be relinqushed most 
reasonably. Defenders of this position will claim that argument (A), minus lines (v) and (vi), provides a 
counterexample to the deontic distribution principle. Adopting any one of the three solutions enables us to avoid 
the inconsistency, but it does so at the expense of forcing us to give up a thesis that at least some have found 
plausible. So if there are genuine moral dilemmas, then we are forced to give up one of two theses, each of 
which one has some reason to hold. In this sense one may regard the existence of apparent moral dilemmas as a 
challenge to the consistency of our current moral beliefs. 
 
Argument (A) shows that standard deontic logic is indeed committed to ruling out the possibility of confliction 
obligations. This same point can be made in another way, and in so doing it will be shown that (T1) leads to a 
second sense of ethical inconsistency. A principle, stated as an axiom in standard systems of deontic logic,7 is 
the principle of deontic consistency, (PC). 
 
(PC) OA ⊃ ~ O ~ A 
 
Intuitively (PC) just says that the same action cannot be obligatory and forbidden. To allow that the same act 
can be morally required and forbidden is not logically contradictory, but it does seem strange. If one accepts 
another principle of standard deontic logic, 
 
(PD) ❑(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (OA ⊃ OB), 
 
it can be shown that (T1) entails the denial of (PC).8 So if there are genuine moral dilemmas, then our ethical 
reasoning is inconsistent in the sense that we are committed to both OA and O ~ A, propositions that are 
contraries according to (PC). And if we give up (PC), we shall also have to drop at least one of two other 
principles, each of which is accepted in most standard systems of deontic logic. The first is that if an action is 
obligatory then it is permissible. The second is that 'permissible' is definable by 'not ought not.' 
 
(a) OA ⊃ PA 
(b) PA ≡ ~ O ~ A 
 
(a) and (b) entail (PC). So if moral dilemmas provide a counterexample to (PC), then at least one of these two 
principles must be given up too. Again we see that systems of standard deontic logic must rule out the 
possibility of genuine moral dilemmas. This shows that if (T1) is true, then our moral reasoning is radically 
different from what it is supposed to be by standard systems of deontic logic. I shall use the phrase `the problem 
of moral dilemmas' as an abbreviated way of indicating that thesis (T1) represents a challenge to such basic 
moral principles as (T2), (T3), (PC), (a), and (b). 
 
Part II 
The problem set out in argument (A) will seem pressing only if each of the three theses is at least plausible. And 
one will need to worry about the adequacy of (PC) only if a good case can be made for (T1). I think that one can 
make a prima facie case for each of the three theses. I shall not document the reasons that have been given to 
support the principle that 'ought' implies 'can.' These are well known, since this so called Kantian principle is 
accepted by many. It is, of course, not an uncontroversial principle. A number of different objections have been 
raised against it. Nonetheless the thesis is held by many. One may wonder, though, why anyone would find (T3) 
plausible. One can cite at least two reasons for supporting this thesis. The first is simply that at the intuitive 
level (T3) seems plausible. If one ought to do each of two things, it seems quite natural to think that one also 
ought to do both of them. Or if there are a number of things each of which one ought to do, it is reasonable for 
one to think that he ought to do all of these things. A second reason for holding (T3) is this. Many have been 
struck by the close analogy between the modal operator '❑' and the deontic operator 'O',' and between the 
modal operator ‘◊’ and the deontic operator 'P.' Since obligation can be and has been construed as a kind of 
deontic or moral necessity, the analogy is a natural one. Some even say that if the analogue of the characteristic 
modal axiom, ❑ A ⊃ A, is added to deontic logic, the resulting systems are identical in form.9 To briefly 
illustrate the parallels, the following analogous principles do hold in standard systems of modal and deontic 
logic. (Here, of course, the modal operators are to be understood as logical necessity and possibility.) 
 
(1) (❑A v ❑B) ⊃ ❑(A v B)   (1') (OA v OB) ⊃ O(A v B) 
(2) ❑(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (❑A ⊃❑B)   (2') O(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (OA ⊃ OB) 
(3) ◊(A v B) ≡ (◊A v ◊B)   (3') P(A v B) ≡ (PA v PB) 
(4) ◊(A & B) ⊃ (◊A & ◊B)   (4') P(A & B) ⊃ (PA & PA) 
 
In addition, the following analogous principles do not hold in standard systems of modal and deontic logic. 
(Since the counterexamples to these principles are well known. I shall not state them.) 
 
(5) ❑(A v B) ⊃ (❑A v ❑B)   (5') O(A v B) ⊃ (OA v OB) 
(6) (◊A & ◊B) ⊃ ◊ (A & B)   (6') (PA & PB) ⊃ P(A & B) 
 
The modal analogue of (T3), (❑A v ❑B) ⊃ ❑(A v B), clearly does hold in standard systems of modal logic. So 
this gives one some reason for believing that (T3) holds as well. And, as we have seen, (T3) is an axiom of 
standard deontic logic. Though these reasons are not conclusive ones, they surely show that the thesis is at least 
plausible. 
 
But is thesis (T1) plausible? At least three reasons have been given for holding (T1). The first is that there are 
examples of situations that at least appear to be genuinely dilemmatic. One well known example is discussed by 
Jean-Paul Sartre in his Existentialism and Humanism. This is the case of the student who believes that he ought 
to join the French forces and try to help defeat the German army. He also believes that he ought to stay at home 
and take care of his mother, who desperately needs his help. But clearly he cannot satisfy both of these ought-
claims. Another example of an apparent moral dilemma occurs in Shakespeare's Measure for Measure. Angelo 
takes over the government of the city and immediately condemns to death one of his subjects, Claudio, for the 
crime of lechery. Isabella, Claudio's sister, goes to plead for her brother's life. She is a devout worshipper and a 
nun. Angelo tells her that he will free her brother only on the condition that she will sleep with him. As a sister 
and one devoted to her family, Isabella believes that she must do what is in her power to save her brother's life. 
As a nun, however, she is morally committed to preserving her virginity. Whatever she does, she believes that 
she will be doing something wrong. 
 
A second reason for holding (T1) recognizes the importance of moral rules in our ordinary reasoning about 
ethical matters. It is always possible for two moral rules to conflict. And it is not just that it is logically possible 
that moral rules will conflict. If one looks at the complexity of the moral lives of most agents, one can hardly 
doubt that moral dilemmas will arise.10 Most people take part in many different roles in society and are 
members of many different social groups. One incurs different obligations or duties as a friend, citizen, worker, 
spouse, etc. Given that each of us is involved in a complex network of relationships, it is very likely that some 
of the ought-claims binding on us will conflict and we will find ourselves in moral dilemmas on some 
occasions. 
 
A third reason has been given to support the claim that there are genuine moral dilemmas. When agents face 
apparently dilemmatic situations they often experience regret after they act. Furthermore, in many cases this 
regret seems quite appropriate and certainly not irrational. Thesis (T1) provides a simple explanation for why a 
conscientious moral agent experiences this feeling and why it is not irrational. The agent experiences regret 
because he has failed to do something that he ought to have done. This provides evidence that the situation is 
genuinely dilemmatic because in many of these cases the agent sees that even if he had acted on the other of the 
conflicting alternatives he would still feel regret.11 According to the advocates of solution (2) this regret shows 
that the agent ought to have done both of the incompatible things, though in fact he could not do both. Hence 
dilemmatic situations show that 'ought' does not imply 'can.' Defenders of solution (3) argue that this shows that 
the agent ought to have done each of the two things, though not both. Thus the existence of moral dilemmas 
forces us to reject (T3). But on either of these views, the regret that the agent experiences is taken as evidence 
for (T1). 
 
It is fair to conclude that each of the three theses is at least plausible. Since this is the case, one can see why the 
problem of moral dilemmas is a worrisome one. 
 
Part III 
As I suggested earlier, I shall argue that the first solution is the most plausible one. If there are good reasons for 
saying that an adequate moral theory must not allow for genuine dilemmas, then the two kinds of ethical 
inconsistency described earlier will have been escaped. One will have avoided the problem to which argument 
(A) calls attention by showing that there are, after all, good reasons for giving up the first thesis of the 
inconsistent triad. The second problem will have been bypassed because one will not be forced to give up (PC) 
if (T1) is false. 
 
Before proceeding, through, a preliminary remark needs to be made. In arguing that (T1) is false I am not 
necessarily ruling out the possibility that an agent can, by doing something forbidden, put himself in a situation 
where no matter what he does he will be doing something wrong. For example, one can take two promises that 
he knows conflict. Thus no matter what the agent does, he will break one of the promises. The situation arose, 
however, because the agent did something wrong. One might call situations like this dilemmatic; but if this 
were the only kind of dilemma that one could encounter, we would not be tempted to say that moral dilemmas 
show that our reasoning about ethical matters is incoherent. As one author suggests, "The existence of such 
cases is not morally disturbing, however, because we feel that the situation is not unavoidable: one had to do 
something wrong in the first place to get into it."12 I shall, therefore, use the term 'genuine moral dilemma' to 
refer only to those quandaries, if there are any, which arise through no fault of the agent himself. Self-imposed 
moral predicaments may raise a number of philosophical problems (such as the problem of expressing contrary-
to-duty imperatives in a standard deontic logic).13 But if this were the only type of dilemma that was possible, 
one would not be likely to conclude that our moral reasoning is incoherent. 
 
As we have seen, there are good reasons for holding (T1). The first task in defending solution (1) is to show that 
these reasons are not sufficient to guarantee the truth of (T1). Let us begin by considering the third reason given 
to support the view that there are genuine moral dilemmas. Is there any way to explain the appropriateness of 
the feeling of regret that an agent in a dilemmatic situation experiences without holding (T1)? To reiterate, the 
presence of regret is thought to show that the agent believes that he failed to do something that he ought to have 
done. And since he also believes the ought-claim that he acted on was binding on him, the situation was 
genuinely dilemmatic. It can be shown, however, that it does not follow that regret is appropriate only if the 
agent believes that he has failed to do something that he ought to have done. Regret, as it is ordinarily 
understood, is appropriate if some good has been lost, or if some bad, even if unavoidable, has obtained.14 It is 
perfectly consistent and quite reasonable to say that an agent has done what he believes he ought, all things 
considered, to have done and feels regret. If one is in a situation where all available alternatives are in some 
sense bad and one did not create the situation by doing something wrong, then the case might be thought to be 
genuinely dilemmatic. If, however, there is a least evil alternative, it seems reasonable to say that there is one 
thing that the agent really ought to do, and the situation is not a genuine dilemma. In such circumstances doing 
the least evil act is surely the most rational thing to do, and one cannot regret having done the most rational 
thing. But one can regret being in a situation where only bad alternatives are open to one. That is, one can regret 
having to live in a world where such cases arise. The upshot of this is that the appropriateness of an agent's 
feeling regret after having acted in an apparently dilemmatic situation is not sufficient to show that the situation 
was genuinely dilemmatic. 
 
The defender of (T1) may try to remedy this account by claiming that agents who act in apparently dilemmatic 
situations experience remorse, and not merely regret. Remorse, as a moral feeling, is appropriate only when the 
agent experiencing it believes that he has done something morally wrong.15 If one assumes that remorse is the 
feeling that a conscientious agent should have after acting in an apparently dilemmatic situation, then (T1) will 
follow trivially.16 It does so at considerable expense, however. This feeling (regret, remorse, or whatever) that a 
moral agent is expected to have is usually cited in a way that is supposed to provide an interesting argument for 
(T1). But if one assumes that the feeling the agent should have is remorse, one will have begged the question 
against the advocate of solution (1) (because the standard philosophical account of remorse says that the feeling 
is appropriate only if the agent has done something wrong). It however, we take this feeling to be regret, then 
we can, as I have already shown, explain why agents in apparently dilemmatic situations have this feeling and 
why it is appropriate that they do. More importantly, that agents appropriately experience regret acknowledges 
that apparently dilemmatic situations are difficult. This difficulty is something that those who believe that there 
are genuine moral dilemmas want to emphasize. One can account for it, though, without holding (T1). So unless 
there are special reasons for taking this feeling to be remorse, it seems that we are justified in taking it to be 
regret. And if we are, the third reason is not sufficient to establish (T1). 
 
We may now deal with the first two reasons for holding (T1). The first reason for believing that there are 
genuine moral dilemmas is that there are numerous examples of situations that certainly appear to be 
dilemmatic, like the case of Sartre's student or the predicament of Isabella in Shakespeare's play. And what will 
the defender of (T1) say to the person who believes that an adequate moral theory must not allow for genuine 
dilemmas? He will probably confront him with these examples and say, "If there are no genuine moral 
dilemmas, then what should the agent do in this situation?" But to suppose that the defender of solution (1) must 
always be able to answer this question is mistaken. It is not incumbent upon the advocate of solution (1) to 
supply the correct moral answer to every apparent quandary. The advocate of solution (1) may admit — and I 
shall develop this suggestion in more detail later — that there are cases in which we do not know what the agent 
ought, all things considered, to do. In other areas of inquiry, for example, history or physics, there may be some 
evidence supporting one hypothesis and some evidence supporting a conflicting hypothesis. That one does not 
know which hypothesis is correct does not by itself cast doubt on the claim that there is a uniquely correct 
answer to the question at issue. So too the admission that one does not know what an agent in a conflict 
situation really ought to do does not by itself cast doubt on solution (1). Since this admission can be made, the 
first reason given to support (T1) is not sufficient. 
 
The second reason cited to show that (T1) is true is that the sources of one's obligations and duties are numerous 
and diverse, and it is highly probable that these will come into conflict. The advocate of solution (1) cannot, of 
course, deny that obligations can and do sometimes conflict. That is, there are sometimes cases where each of 
two ought-claims seems to apply to a situation but both cannot be satisfied. It does not follow from this, 
however, that there are genuine moral dilemmas. No one will deny that there are cases of moral conflict where 
one ought-claim clearly overrides the other. One such case is when one's obligation to help an accident victim 
overrides one's obligation to meet a friend for lunch (as one promised to do). One may regard this as a paradigm 
case of one ought-claim overriding another.17 Since there are cases where the overriding relationship does hold, 
the mere fact that two ought-claims can or do conflict does not show that there are genuine moral dilemmas. 
And this is so even if one does not know in some particular case which ought-claim takes precedence. The 
overriding relationship may still hold such cases. 
 
I have, up to this point, argued for a fairly weak claim: viz., the reasons usually given to support (T1) do not 
guarantee the truth of that thesis. A defender of (T1), however, might well grant this. He might claim, though, 
that the burden of proof is still on the advocate of solution (1). The reason for this, he might argue, is that he has 
shown that there appear to be genuine moral dilemmas. The first two reasons that he gives to support (T1) show 
this. True, he will admit, it is possible that in every conflict case one ought-claim overrides the other. But since 
in many cases we do not know which, if either, overrides the other, appearances support the view that there are 
genuine moral quandaries. In short, the burden of proof will be on one who claims that these appearances are 
deceptive. This response is, I think, correct. It shows that the defender of solution (1) has more work to do; he 
needs to give some reason(s) for believing that (T1) is false. 
 
Part IV 
There are two phenomena that are frequently associated with dilemmatic situations. One is that agents facing 
apparent quandaries frequently seek moral advice. Sartre's student is a case in point. It is important to note that 
the student sought advice because each of two moral claims seemed equally incumbent on him, and he could 
not jointly satisfy them. The second phenomenon is that after acting on one or the other of the alternatives, 
agents in these apparently dilemmatic situations often experience moral doubt. They wonder if they have done 
the right thing; or more typically, they worry that they have done the wrong thing. And not only do agents in 
these situations seek moral advice and experience moral doubt, but in addition in many of these cases we are 
ordinarily prepared to say that such behaviour is appropriate, reasonable, and maybe even expected. That such 
behaviour is regarded as appropriate can easily be explained by the advocate of solution (1). By contrast, it 
seems that advocates of (T1) cannot adequately account for this fact. Let me explain why this is the case. 
 
Suppose that an agent who is in a situation such that it seems that he ought to do each of two things both of 
which he cannot do asks another person for moral advice. If the person whom he asks believes that there are 
genuine moral dilemmas and that the agent is in one, then this person will simply advise the agent that he ought 
to do each (or both)18 of the two actions. The agent would hardly consider this a satisfactory answer. He would 
not have asked for advice had he anticipated this answer. His asking for advice indicates that he believes that 
there is some one thing that he ought to do and he is trying to find out what that is. And since we ordinarily 
regard such behaviour as appropriate, it seems that we too believe that there is some one thing that the agent 
ought to do. The behaviour is appropriate because the agent does not know what he really ought to do. But if the 
advocate of (T1) is correct, the agent does know what he ought, everything considered, to do. He ought to do 
each (or both) of the actions. It seems, then, that the defenders of (T1) cannot claim that the agent is genuinely 
trying to discover what is really morally required of him. Since (according to them) the agent already knows 
what he ought to do, they are committed to saying that such behaviour is irrational. Either that or they will have 
to explain the behaviour as being something other than what it appears to be. 
 
Moral doubt is also often associated with apparently dilemmatic situations. After acting in such situations a 
person will often ask, "Was what I did right?" Depending on the seriousness of the apparent dilemma, the 
person may worry about this for a long time, especially if certain undesirable consequences of his actions are 
frequently evident to him. One can imagine the doubt that Isabella might have experienced had Claudio actually 
been executed. And if Sartre's student had decided to join the French forces and his mother had subsequently 
died, the doubt he would have experienced would probably have been long-lasting. Furthermore, in cases like 
these we think that this doubt is appropriate and certainly not irrational. If one holds (T1) (and also believes that 
the agent in question has just faced a genuine dilemma), then the answer to these questions that the agent raises 
will be obvious. He will say that of course the agent failed to do at least one thing that he ought to have done. 
He may say that the agent is not blameworthy, assuming that he did not get himself into the predicament by 
doing something forbidden. But as long as the agent recognized the force of each of the ought-claims before he 
acted, then it seems that the advocate of (T1) cannot take these questions seriously. He will have to explain 
them as being something other than what they appear to be. He may, for example, say that the agent is involved 
in some sort of self-deception or act of bad faith, and is merely trying to get someone to persuade him that he 
did nothing wrong. Whatever he says, however, it seems that he cannot allow that this experience is genuine 
moral doubt. Yet I think that most of us want to say that in many such cases this moral doubt is genuine. If it is, 
then it seems that the advocate of (T1) will be hard pressed to explain it. That he seems to be forced to treat this 
phenomenon as something other than what it appears to most of us to be is a weakness of his view. 
 
What I have shown so far is that there are two phenomena commonly associated with dilemmatic situations that 
seem either inexplicable, irrational, or something other than what they appear to be if one holds that (T1) is true. 
But suppose that one denies (T1). Can the person who opts for solution (1) explain these two phenomena ade-
quately? I think that he can. There is a way of looking at and explaining apparent moral dilemmas which is both 
plausible and open to the advocate of solution (1). An apparently dilemmatic situation is one where two (or 
more) ought-claims seem to be applicable to one's situation, one cannot act on both of these, and one does not 
know on which of these one ought, everything considered, to act. If this is a plausible account of apparent moral 
dilemmas, then one can support solution (1) and still explain the phenomena that it seems the advocate of (T1) 
cannot adequately explain. The first phenomenon, that moral agents frequently ask what they ought to do even 
after they learn that two moral rules or principles seem to be applicable to their situation, is easily explained. An 
agent asks the question because he does not know what he really ought to do. The case is one of moral conflict, 
but not a genuine moral dilemma (thus I use the term 'moral conflict' in a somewhat technical sense), simply 
because each of two incompatible ought-claims seems legitimate and one does not know on which one ought, 
all things considered, to act. The agent believes that there is one thing that he really ought to do, but he does not 
know what it is. That after acting in apparently dilemmatic situations agents often experience moral doubt also 
can be explained by the advocate of solution (1). When a person is in such a situation, he frequently must act 
within a limited period of time. So he may well be forced to choose between the conflicting alternatives even 
though he does not know on which he ought to act. If at the time of his action he was not sure what he really 
ought to do, it is quite reasonable that after the fact he wonders if what he did was what he really should have 
done. Of course, doubt may arise even if the agent was not uncertain before acting. In such cases the agent does 
not recognize the conflict-nature of his situation until after he has acted. 
 
In section III I showed that giving up thesis (T1) is not as costly as one might think. One can, contrary to what 
some of the advocates of solutions (2) and (3) think, account for why it is not irrational for agents who have 
faced apparently dilemmatic situations to experience regret even if (T1) is false. In this section I have argued 
that unless we support solution (1) we cannot account for the appropriateness of an agent's seeking moral advice 
before acting (in an apparently dilemmatic situation) or for experiencing moral doubt after acting. 
 
Part V 
If my argument is correct, then at the very least the burden of proof has been shifted to those who claim that 
there are genuine moral dilemmas. Put another way, a prima facie case for solution (1) has been made. 
Unfortunately, though, there is what appears to be a fatal objection to this argument. The person who claims 
that there are genuine moral dilemmas does, it seems, have a way of accounting for the appropriateness of an 
agent's seeking moral advice and experiencing moral doubt. The person who holds (T1) can draw a distinction 
between cases of actual moral dilemmas and cases that are only apparently dilemmatic. He can allow, that is, 
that in some cases when two ought-claims conflict there are moral grounds for saying that one takes precedence 
over the other. And he may even grant that such grounds exist when at first glance this does not appear to be the 
case. What he cannot allow, of course, is that every conflict case there is a morally preferable alternative. The 
importance of this distinction is this. The defender of (T1) can admit that when one is in an apparent moral 
dilemma he cannot be sure that the situation is genuinely dilemmatic. Since this is the case, it is quite 
reasonable for (and perhaps even required of) the agent to seek moral advice. If the situation is not genuinely 
dilemmatic, others may be able to help the agent discover what he really ought to do. Even if the situation turns 
out to be genuinely dilemmatic, it may be that one ought to take all reasonable precautions before acting. So 
even if one holds that there are genuine moral dilemmas, it seems that he can account for the appropriateness of 
an agent's seeking moral advice in such circumstances. 
 
The same line of reasoning applies to experiencing moral doubt after the fact. If one has to act in a situation that 
is apparently dilemmatic but may not actually be so, one might needlessly do something wrong. If the situation 
is a genuine dilemma, then one cannot help but do at least one wrong thing. If, however, the situation is merely 
an apparent dilemma, then there is just one thing that the agent really ought to do. Moral doubt is appropriate 
because the agent might have done something wrong when he could have avoided doing so.19 So the defender of 
(T1) can give essentially the same explanation of an agent's seeking moral advice and experiencing moral doubt 
as the advocate of solution (1) can give. 
 
It seems, then, that the person who says that there are genuine moral dilemmas can get around what initally 
appeared to be a very forceful argument against (T1). This response, however, is not without some difficulties. 
The key to the move made by the defender of (T1) is his being able to distinguish moral dilemmas from those 
that are only apparently dilemmatic. An important question must be asked, though. Does the advocate of (T1) 
have a criterion (in the epistemic sense) for distinguishing situations that are truly dilemmatic from those that 
erroneously appear so? Notice that if he did have a plausible criterion he would, in effect, have a 
straightforward argument for (T1). I know of no such criterion, however. In fact, it seems reasonable to assume 
that there is no such criterion; even the defender of (T1) can and must grant this. (He must grant it in order to 
explain why advice-seeking and the experiencing of doubt are appropriate.) 
 
If there is no criterion for picking out genuine dilemmas from apparent ones, then one must raise another 
question. Given that an agent is facing a situation that at least appears to be a dilemma, when will it be rational 
for him to seek advice and experience doubt? There seem to be at least two different responses that the defender 
of (T1) might make. First, he might claim that advice-seeking and experiencing doubt are always appropriate 
because it is impossible for one to tell whether he is an apparent dilemma or a genuine one. To take this line is 
to admit that one must treat every case as if it were only an apparent dilemma. But this puts the defender of (T1) 
in a very weak position. If he admits this much, one may wonder what grounds there are for ever thinking that 
one is in a genuine dilemma. It seems that there are none. To grant that we must presuppose that each case we 
face is only an apparent dilemma is surely to give the advocate of solution (1) all that he needs. After all, the 
advocate of (T1) is recommending that we behave as if solution (1) were correct. Admittedly this is compatible 
with (Ti). But the strongest claim that a defender of this thesis could make is the following: looking back, as it 
were, over a whole range of cases, one may say that some of these cases were genuinely dilemmatic; however, 
one cannot correctly identify the real dilemmas. But even this innocuous version of the first thesis will not be 
defensible. One will not be able to give any reasons to support (T1). Notice, for example, that one will no longer 
be able to point to examples of apparent dilemmas as a reason for holding (T1). Any case to which one points 
will be one where seeking moral advice and experiencing moral doubt are appropriate because one does not 
know (according to the advocate of (T1) himself) what he really ought to do. By his own admission, then, there 
are no situations that are known to be dilemmatic. That there are genuine dilemmas must, it seems, be accepted 
on faith. Surely this first response is not the one that the defender of (T1) will want to make. 
 
Suppose, however, that the defender of (T1) takes a second line. Suppose he says that seeking advice and 
experiencing doubt in apparently dilemmatic situations are not always rational. He may say, for example, that if 
an agent in an apparently dilemmatic situation has good reasons to believe that it is a genuine dilemma (though 
he can never know for sure), then seeking moral advice and experiencing doubt will be irrational. In these cases, 
he might say, resignation or a Stoic-like attitude is more appropriate. One immediate problem with this response 
is spelling out what will count as good reasons for believing that one's situation is genuinely dilemmatic, and it 
is not easy to imagine what the defender of (T1) might say. Perhaps one should merely "take a second look" at 
the available data. If the situation still appears to be dilemmatic, then one may assume that it is really 
dilemmatic. It may be that one should take all reasonable precautions, but doing so need not include going out 
of one's way to seek moral advice or to experience doubt. The problem with taking this line is that it will render 
as inappropriate in far too many cases behaviour that most of us would not regard as such. Surely the ongoing 
doubt that Sartre's student is likely to experience is not irrational. And Isabella's seeking moral advice after 
much pondering (taking several "second looks") does not seem inappropriate. Of course, most of us may be 
wrong in thinking that this doubt is not irrational or that this adviceseeking is not inappropriate. But since the 
advocate of (T1) must treat these cases in a way that does not seem proper, it is up to him to show that these 
appearances are deceptive. 
 
The first thesis, then, conflicts (in a fundamental way) with the way that we regard situations of moral conflict. 
If one defending this thesis says that seeking moral advice and experiencing moral doubt are always appropriate 
when one is facing an apparent predicament, then he will be giving up too much to the defender of solution (1). 
If he says that such behaviour is not always appropriate, then he must spell out under what conditions It is 
inappropriate. And as we have seen, the most natural way of spelling this out commits him to treating some 
behaviour as inappropriate when we would ordinarily regard it as quite reasonable.20 We now can see that the 
objection to the argument put forth in section IV is not one that the defender of (T1) can press. Given this, there 
are good grounds for believing that (T1) is false. 
 
Part VI 
In spite of the above argument, some may still want to claim that there are genuine moral dilemmas. Many who 
hold (T1) do so because they believe that those who advocate solution (1) must present an unrealistic picture of 
the moral life. In particular, to deny that there are moral dilemmas is to be much too optimistic about the moral 
life. One author, referring to a version of what I call solution (1), says, "This view seems to me to make the 
moral life too easy."21 Though this is a common reaction to the thesis that an adequate ethical theory cannot 
allow for genuine dilemmas, it is nonetheless a mistaken one. The advocate of solution (1) is not committed to a 
view that depicts the moral life as too easy. In fact, I have already shown that one who supports solution (1) can 
explain why the moral life is difficult. When an agent is in an apparently dilemmatic situation he has some 
reason to believe that he ought to do each of two things both of which he cannot do. He does not know, 
however, which of these things he ought, all things considered, to do. He will necessarily fail to do at least one 
of the things, and some sort of harm will ensue. (This is why regret is appropriate in such situations.) Many 
apparently dilemmatic situations leave one little time to contemplate or deliberate. The difficulty, then, is that 
an agent may have to act without knowing what he really ought to do.22 Even if the agent had more time to 
deliberate, the situation may be so difficult that he still will not know what to do. It is because of this feature of 
the moral life that an agent's seeking moral advice or experiencing moral doubt is appropriate. And unless we 
are prepared to say that such behaviour is inappropriate, we are committed to believing that (T1) is false. So, 
ironically, some of the difficult aspects of the moral life can be accounted for only if we assume that there are 
no genuine moral dilemmas. 
 
Some critics have asserted that it is no comfort to an agent facing an apparently dilemmatic situation to know 
that there is, in principle, a morally correct solution to his problem even though it is currently unknown to us.23 
The agent must still face a difficult moral problem. To cite this as an objection to solution (1), however, is to 
misunderstand the purpose of that view. Such a critic seems to be attributing to the advocate of solution (1) the 
view that dilemmatic situations only appear to be difficult, and if the agent just reflects he will see that the 
difficulty is only apparent. Solution (1), however, does not entail this. The difficulty involved in apparently 
dilemmatic situations is not illusory, as we have just seen. Solution (1) was never intended to comfort moral 
agents facing conflict situations. If it is intended to comfort anyone it is the moral theorist who is worried — or 
at least should be once he sees the problem of moral dilemmas — about the consistency of our moral reasoning. 
Not only is solution (1) not intended to comfort moral agents facing apparent quandaries, but it explicitly calls 
attention to the difficulty of such cases. That solution (1) gives no comfort to agents in conflict situations is not 
a weakness of the view; it is rather an indication of the realistic picture of the moral life that it presents. 
 
What I have tried to do in this paper is to defend an assumption which has been held, but not really argued for, 
by many ethical theorists: an adequate moral theory must not allow for genuine dilemmas. The most important 
result of this argument is that it provides a solution to the problem set out in argument (A). We do have good 
reasons for giving up the first thesis of the inconsistent triad. And this allows us to retain the most basic 
principles of deontic logic as well, viz., (PC), (a), and (b).24 We may conclude, then, at least with respect to the 
problem of moral dilemmas, that our basic ethical reasoning is not incoherent. 
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